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THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT AND
"POLITICAL RIGHTS"
Akhil Reed Amar*
Professor Xi Wang has offered us an altogether exemplary pa-
per on black suffrage.' Rather than trying to criticize it, I shall
attempt to extend it by picking up where he left off. My main text
is the Fifteenth Amendment. I would like to suggest that the best
interpretation of the Fifteenth Amendment would read it as en-
compassing a cluster of political rights; the Amendment protects
not only the right to vote, but also the right to hold office, the right
to be voted for, the right to vote in a legislature, the right to serve
on a jury, and even the right to serve in the military.
How, you might ask, do I get such a "political rights" cluster
from the words of the Amendment? Of course, we all know that
the Fifteenth Amendment talks about the right to vote. But what
does one do in a legislature? One votes in a legislature. The
Amendment is not limited to voting for office seekers. By the
same token, what do jurors do? Jurors vote. Historically, in
America, not only have jurors voted, but ordinary voters tradition-
ally have been jurors.
Thus far the textual argument. What about military service? I
would argue that we must consider the Fifteenth Amendment and
the Second Amendment in tandem. The Second Amendment ad-
dresses the right of the people to keep and bear arms and contains
the phrase "the people"-a phrase that is used only twice in the
original Constitution. In the Preamble, "We the people.., do or-
dain and establish this Constitution." Who are the people? These
are the political people, acting politically-voting, altering, and
abolishing their government, and ordaining a new Constitution.
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Article I, Section 2 says that "the House of Representatives shall
be ... chosen every second year by the people." Here again, "the
people" is being used quintessentially to mean political rights hold-
ers-voters. Those are the two references in the original Constitu-
tion to "the people."
The First Amendment affirms the right of the people to assem-
ble. It means, among other things, the right of the people to as-
semble in convention to alter or abolish the government. The
Ninth and Tenth Amendments reserve the rights of the people col-
lectively, conjuring up the same political people at the heart of the
Preamble. The Second Amendment links the idea of the people to
the militia. The militia is, in effect, the people in arms. In Republi-
can theory, those who vote traditionally bear arms, and those who
bear arms vote. These are just a few textual and structural points.
Now consider some rather broad historical arguments. In the
American constitutional tradition, in the absence of a clear state-
ment to the contrary, the qualifications for voting, unless otherwise
specified, typically encompass the right to be voted for, the right to
hold office, and the right to serve on a jury. So let's take de Toc-
queville, for example:
The jury system as understood in America, seems to me to be as
direct and extreme a consequence of the ... sovereignty of the
people as universal suffrage. They are both equally powerful
means of making the majority prevail.... [T]he jury is above all
a political institution; it should be made to harmonize with other
laws establishing that sovereignty .... [F]or society to be gov-
erned in a settled and uniform manner, it is essential that the
jury lists should expand or shrink with the lists of voters.2
Narrowing the focus, we turn to the history of the Fifteenth
Amendment itself. Early drafts of the Fifteenth Amendment in
both the House and Senate versions explicitly spoke of the right to
vote and to hold office. However, by the time the Amendment
came out of a joint committee, all references to the "right to hold
office" had been removed. This seems a bit odd, because members
had specifically agreed, prior to committee, to include this right.
Some have interpreted this as a narrowing of the Amendment-
the Amendment, perhaps, was only about voting, and not about
the right to be voted for or the right to hold office. But this inter-
pretation does not seem entirely plausible. In fact, it is more likely
2 ALEXIS DE TOCoUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 273 (J.P. Mayer ed., George
Lawrence trans., 1969); see also id. at 728 (In general, in America, "all citizens who are
electors have the right to be jurors.").
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that the language was eliminated because it was superfluous. Not
only was it unnecessary, but more importantly, it was undesirable
precisely because it implied that the right to hold office needed
specification above and beyond the right to vote. And Congress-
man Butler stated "that the right to elect [someone] to office car-
ries with it the inalienable and indissoluble and indefeasible right
to be elected to office." 3 Similarly, Senator Stewart stated that the
right to be elected to the legislature was as plainly provided by the
Amendment as was the right to vote.4
In the months preceding the adoption of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, a huge debate had erupted over Georgia's recent readmis-
sion to the Union. The issue was whether Georgia should be
thrown back out of the Union. Georgia, which had just come back
into the Union with a newly reconstructed legislature, decided to
exclude blacks from holding office. This is the very same Georgia
government that had just agreed not to discriminate in the vote on
the basis of race. This agreement was part of the Georgia state con-
stitution; moreover, readmission was contingent upon accepting
this condition. Georgia said, in essence, "We haven't broken the
deal; the deal says that we let blacks vote, and we have. But voting
isn't about the right to be voted for; it's not the right to vote in the
legislature."
The Republicans in Congress were outraged. From their view-
point, ordinary voters are, in effect, disenfranchised when they are
told that they cannot vote for candidates in their first choice. So,
indeed, Georgia was again thrown out of the Union and excluded
from Congress on the explicit theory that the right to vote encom-
passed the right to be voted for.
So, in fact, the narrower history of the Fifteenth Amendment
does support the idea that voting is understood to encompass the
right to be voted for and to serve on office. This congeals with a
broader understanding of the distinction at the time between civil
and political rights. The Fourteenth Amendment is about civil
rights, and the Fifteenth Amendment is about political rights.
Where does this key distinction come from? What is the origin of
the idea of the political rights cluster of voting, holding office, jury
service, and militia service? The cluster is derived, in part, from a
constitutional tradition under Article IV-the Comity Clause-
which addresses privileges and immunities of citizens in several
3 CONG. GLOBE 40th Cong., 3d Sess. 1426 (1869).
4 See Vikram David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80
CORNELL L. REV. 203, 229 n.141 (1995).
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states. For example, a Massachusetts man is entitled not to be
treated as an alien in South Carolina. This means that the Massa-
chusetts man should be treated as a fellow citizen and should be
allowed to own real property, a right that aliens lacked in South
Carolina. But a Massachusetts man with many "civil" rights in
South Carolina cannot participate in four specific activities: (1) vot-
ing in South Carolina elections; (2) holding office in the South Car-
olina legislature; (3) serving on a South Carolina jury; or (4)
serving in a South Carolina militia.
Here is another way of viewing the key nineteenth century dis-
tinction between civil and political rights. Let's take the category
of women. Women are paradigmatic citizens. Unlike free blacks
after the Dred Scott5 case, women could sue and be sued in diver-
sity jurisdiction. And if unmarried, they had the right to own real
property in their own names, make contracts, speak freely, and so
on. But they did not have the right to vote, to hold office, to serve
on a jury, or to serve in a militia. Part of the justification for ex-
cluding women from the Fifteenth Amendment-under the theory
that it was "the black man's hour"-was precisely that women had
not served in the Union army. We now begin to see an interesting
link in Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment between the pre-
sumptive militia-male citizens over twenty-one years of age resid-
ing in the state-and presumptive voters.
Thus far, I have made some textual points, some broad histori-
cal arguments from the founding period, and some narrow histori-
cal arguments about the legislative history of the Fifteenth
Amendment. Finally, let me close with some post-enactment his-
torical and doctrinal arguments.
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 banned discrimination in jury ser-
vice on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
In short, blacks could not be excluded from jury service. This Act
is hard to justify on the basis of the Thirteenth Amendment, be-
cause in the antebellum era there were free states in which free
blacks were nonetheless barred from jury service. And women
were free, but not able to serve as jurors. It is also hard to justify
this 1875 Act on the basis of the Fourteenth Amendment because
that Amendment addressed civil, not political, rights. Indeed, the
language used in the 1875 Act-"race, color, or previous condition
of servitude" 6-derives directly from Fifteenth Amendment
language.
5 See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
6 Act of March 1, 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875), codified at 18 U.S.C. § 243.
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The famous Strauder v. West Virginia7 case talks about blacks
serving on juries in cases where blacks were the defendants. The
Supreme Court has since made clear that, regardless of the parties
involved in the case, blacks cannot be discriminated against in jury
service. The defendants in the Rodney King case were not black,
and discrimination on the basis of race in jury selection was still
unacceptable. I suggest that the only way to account for the cen-
tury of cases, beginning with Strauder and ending with cases this
decade,8 is with a Fifteenth Amendment theory.
This theory has radical implications for other subsequent con-
stitutional amendments, which extended the right to vote to wo-
men in the Nineteenth Amendment, the poor in the Twenty-fourth
Amendment, and the young in the Twenty-sixth Amendment. As
voting rights have extended to these groups, their rights to serve on
juries, to serve in the legislature, to run for office, and to serve in
the military must be taken seriously. Women in the draft and wo-
men in jury service are both Nineteenth Amendment issues, on this
account. And so the story that Xi Wang began continues on today,
with remarkably broad implications.
7 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
8 See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992); Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400
(1991); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
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